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Abstract 
Children and adults differentiate statements of religious belief from statements of fact and 
opinion, but the basis of that differentiation remains unclear. Across three experiments, adults 
and 8-10-year-old children heard statements of factual, opinion-based, and religious belief. 
Adults and children judged that statements of factual belief revealed more about the world, 
statements of opinion revealed more about individuals, and statements of religious belief 
provided information about both. Children—unlike adults—judged that statements of religious 
belief revealed more about the world than the believer. These results led to three conclusions. 
First, judgments concerning the relative amount of information statements of religious belief 
provide about individuals change across development, perhaps because adults have more 
experience with diversity. Second, recognizing that statements of religious belief provide 
information about the world and the believer does not require protracted learning. Third, 
statements of religious belief are interpreted as amalgams of factual and opinion-based 
statements.  
Keywords: beliefs, religious cognition, social cognition, social cognitive development 
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What Do Different Beliefs Tell Us? An Examination of Factual, Opinion-Based, and 
Religious Beliefs 
  How do children and adults reason about their own and other people’s beliefs? More 
specifically, how do children and adults conceptualize statements concerning beliefs in the 
domain of religion as compared with the better-studied domains of fact and opinion? Situating 
this question in terms of epistemological understanding, the current research examines both 
children and adults to investigate the development of reasoning about beliefs. This work deepens 
the psychological understanding of religious cognition by providing information about how 
children and adults conceive of others’ religious beliefs. It also enhances psychological 
understanding of epistemology more broadly by clarifying how children and adults judge 
statements of religious belief as compared with statements of factual knowledge and statements 
of opinion. Finally, the current work clarifies the type of knowledge (knowledge about the world 
vs. knowledge about individuals) that children and adults judge statements of religious belief, as 
compared with statements of factual and opinion-based belief, to provide.  
1. Epistemological Development 
Current research on children’s understanding of beliefs has been heavily influenced by 
Kuhn and colleagues’ (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) mapping 
of epistemological stages (see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, for a review). This work identified three 
stages of epistemological development. At the absolutist stage, individuals think of assertions as 
akin to facts. They judge that the external world, not the individual person, is the source of the 
information. If two people disagree, it must be because they have access to different information, 
not because they have interpreted the same information differently. In the next stage—the 
multiplist stage—individuals think of assertions as akin to opinions. If two people disagree, both Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 4 
perspectives are equally valid. Individuals at the third, evaluativist stage judge that assertions can 
be evaluated in comparison with available evidence. If two people disagree, both could be right, 
but one could be “more right” if more evidence supports his or her claim.  
An individual’s level of epistemological understanding influences a number of important 
outcomes. For example, in one study (Mason & Scirica, 2006), epistemological understanding 
predicted stronger argumentation skills in Italian 8
th graders. Thus, children at the evaluativist 
stage were more likely to generate valid arguments, counter-arguments, and rebuttals than 
children at the multiplist stage. Levels of epistemological understanding also predict the extent to 
which adult jurors use evidence-based reasoning (Kuhn, Weinstock & Flaton, 1994; Warren, 
Kuhn, & Weinstock, 2010; Weinstock & Cronin, 2003). 
Especially relevant to the current studies is the flourishing literature investigating the 
influence of domain on epistemological understanding. Kuhn et al. (2000) found that children 
were likely to move to a multiplist stage first in the domain of opinion and last in the domain of 
fact. Several other studies have also shown that children differentiate between these two 
domains. For example, 3-year-olds acknowledge and understand disagreements between 
individuals about matters of taste and opinion more readily than disagreements about matters of 
fact (Flavell et al., 1990). In addition, children ranging from 6 to 10 years of age are less likely to 
defer to experts regarding matters of taste as compared to matters of fact (Banerjee et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the ability to understand the differences between opinion-based and factual beliefs 
undergoes consolidation in middle childhood. For example, 6-year-olds do not differ in the 
frequency with which they refer to internal (e.g., individual differences in taste) versus external 
(e.g., access to information) factors in explaining whether or not disagreements in the domains of 
fact and opinion are acceptable. By contrast, 8-year-olds and adults tend to invoke internal Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 5 
factors in the context of opinion-based disagreements and external factors in the context of 
factual disagreements (Rowley & Robinson, 2007).    
Beyond the domains of fact and opinion, children aged 5-13 years have proven to be least 
likely to accept disagreements about moral beliefs (Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, & Lewis, 
2004; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998). Though children typically experience difficulty 
accepting moral disagreements, some programs have successfully improved children’s 
acceptance of moral debate and disagreement. After participating in a discussion-based 
philosophy class, 2
nd graders argued more effectively and were more likely to shift away from an 
absolutist level than children in a control group without discussion opportunities (Walker, 
Wartenberg, & Winner, 2013). This shift was observed only for the domain of moral values. No 
such shift was observed for the aesthetic, physical, or social domains, highlighting the distinctive 
nature of moral beliefs. 
Research on epistemological understanding has rarely focused on religious beliefs. 
However, two recent studies are pertinent. First, working with middle-class, Jewish children 
attending 5
th, 8
th, and 12
th grade in secular or religious schools in Israel, Gottlieb (2007) found 
that older pupils were more likely than younger pupils to argue for “non-rationalism”—to claim 
that disagreements about the existence of God cannot be resolved by rational procedures such as 
empirical investigation or logical proof. Thus, children increasingly recognize that there may be 
aspects of religious belief that reflect an individual’s personal stance rather than a rationally-
guided decision process. Second, Shtulman (2013) asked undergraduates at two selective 
colleges to justify their belief in various religious entities (e.g., God, souls, angels) as well as 
various scientific entities (e.g., electrons, fluoride, genes). Students were more likely to justify 
their beliefs by deferential reference to authority or instruction rather than by citing pertinent Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 6 
evidence. A dearth of evidential justifications was especially pronounced among those students 
who endorsed more of the religious items. Taken together, these two studies suggest that 
religious beliefs may be construed as reflections of an individual’s personal commitments rather 
than only reflecting empirical evidence. At the same time, individuals may believe that religious 
claims reveal at least some information about the world (e.g., because many religious claims, on 
their face, are statements about the world)—a prediction tested in the present research. 
The current research extends the literature on epistemological understanding in two ways. 
First, we probed how children conceptualize different types of belief. More specifically, we 
tested the prediction that children and adults judge that statements concerning factual beliefs 
reveal information about the world whereas statements concerning opinion-based beliefs reveal 
information about the individual stating the belief. Second, we investigated religious beliefs, 
which, as noted above, have rarely been targeted in research on epistemological understanding. 
We tested the hypothesis that statements concerning religious beliefs would be perceived as 
providing information about individual believers as well as the world. 
2. Children’s and Adults’ Reasoning About Religious Beliefs  
Previous work clearly demonstrates the importance of religious beliefs to adults (Atran, 
2002; Boyer, 2001). Religious beliefs and rituals form an important component of adults’ social 
identities (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010), are associated with increased health and 
well-being (McCullough, Friedman, Enders, & Martin, 2009), and influence pro-social behavior 
(Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Moreover, even young children are able to reason about religious 
phenomena. For example, by the age of 5, children use theistic explanations to account for 
natural phenomena (Kelemen, 2004). Five-year-olds in the United States, Spain, and Greece 
attribute greater cognitive and perceptual abilities to God than to humans (Barrett, Richert, & Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 7 
Driesenga, 2001; Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 2005; Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010, 
2012; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007). Additionally, 6-12 year old children from Christian schools 
differentiate souls from other invisible aspects of human beings, such as minds and brains 
(Richert & Harris, 2006). 
Religious beliefs share several features with other types of beliefs. As with scientific 
beliefs, children, like adults, acquire many religious beliefs via the testimony of other people, 
particularly when the beliefs concern non-visible phenomena such as the soul or the afterlife 
(Harris & Corriveau, in press; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Shtulman, 2013). Nevertheless, some 
theorists suggest that children distinguish religious beliefs from other ways of knowing. For 
example, McCauley (2000; 2011) argues that while religion is natural, science is not (see also 
Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1994). According to this framework, religious beliefs appeal to notions that 
are intuitively compelling to most people, such as the idea that an agent created the universe 
(Guthrie, 1993; Kelemen, 2004). On the other hand, there is also developmental evidence that 
some religious beliefs (e.g., the belief that God is omniscient and immortal) are counterintuitive 
rather than intuitive. In this respect, the gradual acquisition of certain scientific and religious 
beliefs display important, albeit neglected, parallels (Lane & Harris, in press). 
One recent set of experiments (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2013) investigated the 
extent to which American 5-10 year old children and adults distinguish religious from factual 
and opinion-based beliefs. When told that two characters disagreed about a particular type of 
belief, participants of all ages were most likely to say that only one person could be right when 
responding to factual beliefs (e.g., about the size of germs) and least likely to provide this answer 
when responding to opinion-based beliefs (e.g., about the prettiest color). Religious beliefs (e.g., 
about whether God can do miracles) fell between these two extremes. Children and adults were Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 8 
more likely to respond that only one person could be right when judging factual disagreements 
rather than religious disagreements, but they were also more likely to respond that only one 
person could be right when judging religious disagreements rather than opinion-based 
disagreements.  
These findings raised the important question of how children and adults make these 
distinctions. That is, what process leads children and adults to position religious disagreements in 
an intermediate position between disagreements concerning factual beliefs and disagreements 
concerning opinion-based beliefs? We suggest that the findings from Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, et 
al. (2013) indicate that children as well as adults think of religious beliefs as being more 
revealing about the world than opinion-based beliefs but also more revealing about the person 
than fact-based beliefs. These judgments may lead individuals to conclude that statements of 
religious belief are somewhat like statements of factual belief (because both reveal at least 
something about the external world) and somewhat like statements of opinion (because both 
reveal at least something about the person holding the belief). At the same time, religious 
statements do not completely overlap with either category. They may be perceived to provide 
more information about the person holding the belief than do correct factual statements but more 
information about the world than do statements of opinion. Thus, the present research goes 
beyond the findings of Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, et al. (2013) by examining the types of 
knowledge (knowledge about the external world vs. knowledge about individual people) that 
children and adults judge different types of beliefs to provide.  
3. The Relationship between Children’s and Adults’ Cognition 
  If a great deal of experience with others’ beliefs is needed to draw distinctions between 
different kinds of beliefs, adults—who typically have far more experience with others’ beliefs—Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 9 
may reason differently from children. For example, adults have had more time to develop their 
own religious beliefs and to encounter people who disagree with their views. Furthermore, adults 
have had more time to learn their culture’s messages about the supernatural, messages that can 
play an important role in shaping individuals’ reasoning (Harris & Koenig, 2006; Legare, Evans, 
Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). Arguably then, children, who have less experience with religious 
diversity, would be more likely to perceive statements of religious belief as akin to statements of 
fact, about which most people agree. 
However, other aspects of religious cognition may depend on social learning to a lesser 
extent. For example, because religious claims are ostensibly claims about the external world, 
children may judge that such claims reveal at least some amount of information about the world. 
This prediction is bolstered by evidence suggesting that children sometimes demonstrate 
surprisingly adult-like cognition. For example, children as well as adults judge statements of 
religious belief to be more objective than statements of opinion-based belief but less objective 
than statements of factual belief (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris et al., 2013).  
Admittedly, finding differences between children and adults would not reveal which 
aspect of development is responsible for these changes. However, finding continuity in this 
particular aspect of cognition would suggest that the additional decades of social experience that 
adults have as compared to 8-10 year-olds may not be necessary for adult-like reasoning about 
statements of religious belief to emerge.   
4. Overview of Current Experiments 
We conducted three experiments, two with adults (Experiments 1A and 1B) and one with 
8-10 year old children (Experiment 2). Participants learned about another person’s factual, Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 10 
opinion-based, or religious belief and then indicated how much information had been provided 
about (i) the world in general and (ii) the person holding the belief.  
Because we sought to learn about how humans conceive of factual beliefs in general, 
regardless of the truth status of a particular belief, we chose to present both correct and incorrect 
factual beliefs. Had we presented only correct factual beliefs, we would not know whether our 
results show how individuals conceive of factual beliefs in general or how they conceive of 
statements known to be true. If participants reason about all factual beliefs in the same way, 
regardless of their truth status, then they should respond similarly to both correct and incorrect 
factual beliefs. However, we also anticipated that participants might judge that incorrect factual 
beliefs reveal less about the world than do correct factual beliefs because less accurate 
information is revealed in the former case.  
5. Experiment 1A 
  The purpose of Experiment 1A was to investigate the distinctions adults may draw 
between statements concerning religious, factual, and opinion-based beliefs. We hypothesized 
that participants would judge that different beliefs reveal different types of information. Even 
preschoolers judge that factual beliefs reveal information about the world (Heyman, 2008) while 
opinion-based beliefs reveal information about people (Fawcett & Markson, 2010). Thus, we 
predicted that adults would judge that factual beliefs reveal more information about the world 
while opinion-based beliefs reveal more information about the person who holds the belief.  
  The main question of interest concerned religious beliefs. On their face, such beliefs are 
statements about the world; for example, the statement “God can hear prayer” implies the 
existence of an agent with particular abilities. However, religious beliefs are also controversial. 
Not everyone believes that God can hear prayer, or that God even exists. An individual making Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 11 
these statements distinguishes him- or herself from a number of people holding different views 
and thereby also reveals information about the individual. Thus, we predicted that statements of 
religious belief would be perceived to provide information both about the world and about the 
person holding the belief. Note that this prediction differs from the results already obtained by 
Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, et al. (2013), who found that children and adults positioned statements 
of religious beliefs between statements of factual belief and statements of opinion-based belief 
when presented with a disagreement and asked whether only one or both of the people who 
disagreed could be right. Rather than focusing on judgments of disagreements, the current 
research investigates the amount and type of knowledge participants perceive statements of each 
category of belief to reveal. That is, the current research investigates cognitive processes that 
may underlie children’s capacity to distinguish statements of religious belief from statements of 
factual belief and statements of opinion. Whereas Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that children are capable of making such distinctions, the current work investigates 
how these distinctions are made. The novel prediction of the current research is that statements of 
religious belief will be perceived to provide some knowledge about the external world (similarly 
to statements of factual belief) and some knowledge about individual people (similarly to 
statements of opinion). 
5.1 Method 
  5.1.1 Participants.  
    The sample included 40 adults (24 women) between the ages of 17 and 40 years 
(M = 21;11). Participants were recruited through a psychology department’s subject pool, which 
includes both students and non-student community members. Participants received course credit 
or the opportunity to enter a gift certificate lottery. The sample was 53% White. Participants Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 12 
were asked to indicate their highest level of educational attainment using a scale ranging from 
“some high school” to PhD or other post-graduate professional degrees (e.g., MD). On average, 
participants reported their educational attainment as “some college,” though the modal response 
was “some high school.” On a demographic questionnaire completed at the end of the session, 
participants self-identified as Protestant (10%), Catholic (10%), other Christian (10%), Jewish 
(8%), Muslim (15%), atheist or agnostic (40%), and some other, unlisted religion (8%). In this 
and all subsequent studies, participants identifying with any religious group were classified as 
theists, while participants identifying as atheist or agnostic were classified as non-theists. 
5.1.2 Procedure.  
  Participants completed the study online. They first read the following set of 
instructions: “In this study, you will read about some things that other people think. Sometimes 
people say things that tell us a lot about themselves, and sometimes people say things that don’t 
tell us anything about themselves at all. And sometimes people say things that tell us a lot about 
the world in general, and sometimes people say things that don’t tell us anything about the world 
at all. For example, if someone says that she won three games of Scrabble, she’s telling us 
something about herself. If someone says that the Red Sox won three games of baseball, he’s 
telling us something about the world in general. After you read about what each person thinks, 
please use the scales provided to indicate how much that person has told you about themselves, 
and how much that person has told you about the world in general.” Following these instructions, 
participants read one person’s belief at a time; beliefs were prefaced with the phrase, “Someone 
says that. . . ” (e.g., “Someone says that God can do miracles”). Characters were not represented 
by images. Following each item, participants answered two questions: “How much has this 
person told you about the world in general?” and, “How much has this person told you about Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 13 
him/herself?” The order of these questions was consistent within participants but varied across 
participants. Participants answered using a scale from 1 (“nothing at all”) to 4 (“a lot”). 
Statements concerned matters of factual belief (correct and incorrect), religious belief, and 
opinion-based belief. There were twenty items total, for a total of forty experimental questions 
(see Appendix A). Participants also completed a demographic form at the end of the session.  
5.2 Results  
We analyzed responses to questions concerning how much participants had learned using 
a 4 (Belief Category: correct fact vs. incorrect fact vs. religion vs. opinion) X 2 (Question 
Category: person vs. world) X 2 (Participant Background: theist vs. non-theist)
1 mixed-model 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two factors. Three main effects emerged. First, we 
found a main effect of Background: participants who self-identified as members of a religious 
group reported learning less about individuals and the world combined than did participants who 
self-identified as atheist or agnostic (Mtheist = 2.42, SDtheist = .41, Mnon-theist = 2.68, SDnon-theist = 
.37, F (1, 38) = 5.01, p < .05). This result was unpredicted and was not replicated in Experiments 
1B and 2; therefore, additional replication is needed before it can be interpreted. Second, we 
found a main effect of Question Type (F (1, 38) = 72.52, p < .001). Third, we found a main 
effect of Belief Type (F (3, 114) = 15.56, p < .001). The latter two effects were qualified by a 
Question Type X Belief Type interaction (F (3, 114) = 59.40, p < .001). This interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 1 (left panel). No other interactions reached significance. 
When indicating how much they had learned about the world, participants reported 
learning more from statements of correct factual belief (M = 2.84, SD = .78) than from 
statements of religious belief (M = 2.27, SD = .66, p < .001) but more from statements of 
religious belief than from either statements of opinion-based belief (M = 1.58, SD = .56, p < Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 14 
.001) or statements of incorrect factual belief (M = 1.75, SD = .70, p < .001), which did not differ 
from each other. At the individual level, this pattern (statements of religious belief occupying an 
intermediate position between statements of correct factual belief and statements of opinion) 
occurred among 70% of participants.  
When indicating how much they had learned about the person holding the belief, 
participants reported learning equal amounts from statements of religious belief (M = 3.23, SD = 
.57), incorrect factual beliefs (M = 3.15, SD = .76), and opinion-based belief (M = 3.01, SD = 
.68; in all pairwise comparisons, ps > .05). Participants reported learning less about individuals 
after hearing their correct factual beliefs (M = 1.88, SD = .64) than their opinion-based beliefs (p 
< .001). At the individual level, this pattern (statements of correct factual belief rated as 
providing less information about the person than statements of religious belief and opinion) 
occurred among 80% of participants. 
Finally, participants reported learning more about the world than about the person from 
statements of their correct factual beliefs, whereas for the remainder of the belief categories, 
participants reported learning more about the person than the world (in all pairwise comparisons, 
ps < .001).  
5.3 Discussion 
  These results suggest that participants may view statements concerning religious beliefs 
as amalgams of statements concerning factual beliefs and statements concerning opinion-based 
beliefs. On the one hand, like statements of correct factual belief, statements of religious belief 
were perceived to provide some information about the world in general—more so than 
statements of opinion-based belief or incorrect factual belief. On the other hand, like statements 
of opinion-based belief, statements of religious belief were perceived to provide information Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 15 
about the individual holding the belief—and, in fact, to provide more information about the 
individual than about the world. Thus, adults may view statements of religious belief as 
somewhat akin to statements of factual belief and somewhat akin to statements of opinion-based 
belief without being exactly like either category. 
  However, adults’ responses to statements of incorrect factual belief present a puzzle. 
Specifically, adults responded that they had learned a great deal about others after learning their 
incorrect factual beliefs—as much as after learning their religious and opinion-based beliefs, and 
significantly more than after learning their correct factual beliefs. Yet the statements of incorrect 
factual belief did not contain any explicit statements concerning the self. One possibility is that, 
contrary to our expectations, adults interpreted the question, “How much has this person told you 
about him/herself?” to include accidental revelations. For example, they may have judged that a 
person who claimed that germs are very big unintentionally revealed that he/she was ignorant.  
Similarly, if adults interpreted our questions to include accidental revelations, this may 
have accounted for their responses to the religion items. Adults hold more positive attitudes 
toward religious in-group members than toward out-group members (Heiphetz, Spelke, & 
Banaji, 2013; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005) and especially negative attitudes toward atheists 
(Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). Thus, adults may have judged that characters making 
religious claims with which they agreed were nicer than characters making religious claims with 
which they disagreed. In this case, adults’ responses would not provide information about how 
they reasoned about statements of religious belief; rather, their responses would provide 
information about how they reasoned about people who espouse particular religious views. We 
sought to block this potential influence in Experiment 1B by providing more detailed instructions Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 16 
and phrasing our dependent measures in a way that specifically highlighted the character’s 
intentional revelations.  
6. Experiment 1B 
6.1 Method 
  6.1.1 Participants.  
  The sample included 26 adults (21 women) between the ages of 18 and 30 years (M = 
21;11). Recruitment and compensation were identical to Experiment 1A. The sample was 58% 
White. On average, participants reported their highest educational attainment as “four-year 
college degree,” though the modal response was “some college.” Participants self-identified as 
Protestant (19%), Catholic (27%), other Christian (4%), atheist or agnostic (42%), and some 
other, unlisted religion (8%).  
6.1.2 Procedure.  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1A, with the following exception: The last 
line of the instructions read, “. . .indicate how much you think that person intended to tell you 
about themselves, and how much that person intended to tell you about the world in general” and 
the questions were changed to, “How much is this person trying to tell you about [the world in 
general/him/herself?]” 
6.2 Results  
  We performed eight independent-samples t-tests to investigate the effect of religious 
background on responses to how much participants thought the character intended to reveal 
about the world and, separately, about him/herself in each of the four belief domains (correct 
fact, incorrect fact, religion, and opinion). After performing a Bonferroni correction, these Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 17 
analyses revealed no differences between religious and non-religious participants; therefore, 
subsequent analyses collapsed across these groups. 
We analyzed responses to questions concerning how much information participants 
thought characters intended to provide by using a 4 (Belief Category: correct fact vs. incorrect 
fact vs. religion vs. opinion) X 2 (Question Category: person vs. world) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. The main effect of Belief Category (F (3, 72) = 17.21, p < .001) was qualified by a 
Belief Category X Question Category interaction (F (2.11, 50.69) = 56.18, p < .001).
2 This 
interaction is illustrated in Figure 1 (middle panel). The main effect of Question Category failed 
to reach significance.  
Participants reported that characters intended to convey more about the world in stating 
correct factual beliefs (M = 3.48, SD = .73) than in stating their religious beliefs (M = 3.14, SD = 
.61, p < .05); more in stating their religious beliefs than their incorrect factual beliefs (M = 2.68, 
SD = .97, p < .01); and more in stating their incorrect factual beliefs than their opinion-based 
beliefs (M = 1.84, SD = .67, p < .001). At the individual level, this pattern (statements of 
religious belief occupying an intermediate position between statements of correct factual belief 
and statements of opinion) occurred among 62% of participants. 
Participants also reported that characters intended to convey more about themselves in 
stating their opinion-based beliefs (M = 3.46, SD = .74) than their religious beliefs (p < .05); 
more in stating their religious beliefs than their incorrect factual beliefs (M = 2.47, SD = .72, p < 
.001); and more in stating their incorrect factual beliefs than their correct factual beliefs (M = 
1.68, SD = .61, p < .001). At the individual level, this pattern (statements of religious belief 
occupying an intermediate position between statements of correct factual belief and statements of 
opinion) occurred among 69% of participants. Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 18 
Finally, participants reported that characters intended to convey more information about 
the world than about themselves when making correct factual claims (p < .001), more about 
themselves than the world when making opinion-based claims (p < .001), and equal amounts 
about both the world and themselves when making religious claims and incorrect factual claims 
(ps > .05). 
To directly assess the influence of highlighting intentionality in Experiment 1B, we 
analyzed the data from Experiments 1A and 1B together by conducting a 4 (Belief Category: 
correct fact vs. incorrect fact vs. religion vs. opinion) X 2 (Question Category: person vs. world) 
X 2 (Experiment: 1A vs. 1B) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two 
factors. Each of the variables exerted a main effect (Belief Category: F (3, 189) = 33.61, p < 
.001; Question Category: F (1, 63) = 12.12, p = .001; Experiment: F (1, 63) = 7.24, p < .01). 
These main effects were qualified by a Belief Category X Question Category interaction, F 
(2.49, 157.06) = 108.74, p < .001, by a Question Category X Experiment interaction, F (1, 63) = 
23.85, p < .001, and by a Belief Category X Question Category X Experiment interaction, F 
(2.49, 157.06) = 10.90, p < .001. The Belief Category X Experiment interaction did not reach 
significance. 
To better understand the 3-way interaction, we examined the simple effect of Question 
Category for each of the 8 combinations of Belief Category and Experiment. These simple 
effects tests reinforced and extended the conclusions already drawn from the analysis of each 
experiment considered separately. Participants in both experiments judged that correct factual 
claims revealed (or were intended to reveal) more information about the world than about the 
individual (both ps < .001). Conversely, participants in both experiments judged that opinion-
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about the world (both ps < .001). The results of the two experiments differed for the two 
remaining belief categories. In the categories of religion and incorrect fact, participants judged 
that characters had revealed less about the world than about themselves in Experiment 1A (both 
ps < .001) whereas participants judged that characters had intended to reveal statistically 
equivalent amounts about themselves and the world in Experiment 1B (both ps > .05). The most 
plausible explanation of these differences between the two experiments is that adults in 
Experiment 1A focused on what speakers had actually conveyed about the world and judged 
them to be only partially successful relative to what they had inadvertently revealed about 
themselves. By contrast, adults in Experiment 1B recognized that speakers had intended to 
convey more information about the world—as much as they conveyed about themselves. 
6.3 Discussion 
Like Experiment 1A, Experiment 1B suggests that adults perceive statements of religious 
belief as somewhat similar to statements of factual belief and somewhat similar to statements of 
opinion-based belief. On the one hand, adults judged that characters making religious claims and 
correct factual claims intended to provide some information about the world in general—more so 
than when characters made opinion-based or incorrect factual claims. On the other hand, adults 
judged that characters making religious claims and opinion-based claims intended to provide 
some information about themselves. The two ratings for religious beliefs were less asymmetric 
than the two ratings for either correct factual beliefs or opinion-based beliefs, suggesting that 
adults perceive statements of religious belief to share some (but not all) properties of statements 
concerning correct factual beliefs and statements concerning opinion-based beliefs.  
The results from Experiment 1B also suggest that the unexpected responses of 
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in response to statements concerning both religious and incorrect factual beliefs, may have been 
due to participants including unintentional revelations in their judgments. When the question was 
clarified to block such judgments, both types of statements were perceived to provide equal 
amounts of information about the world and the individual. Moreover, the rating of statements 
concerning religious belief fell between the extreme ratings for statements concerning correct 
factual belief and opinion-based belief both in response to questions about the world and in 
response to questions about the person. 
7. Experiment 2 
  Experiments 1A and 1B showed that adults judge that statements of religious belief 
provide some information about the world, like statements of factual belief, and some 
information about individual people, like statements of opinion-based belief. The purpose of 
Experiment 2 was to determine the extent to which children respond to statements of belief in an 
adult-like fashion. 
7.1 Method 
  7.1.1 Participants.  
The sample included 84 children (45 girls) between the ages of 8 and 10 years (M = 9;1). 
Children of this age, like adults, distinguish statements of religious belief from statements of 
factual as well as opinion-based belief (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris et al., 2013); pre-testing 
revealed that they could also easily use continuous scales to respond to questions. Children were 
recruited through a departmental database and in a museum in the northeastern United States, 
and they received a small toy in exchange for their participation. The sample was 69% White. On 
a demographic questionnaire completed during the experiment, parents identified their children Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	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as Protestant (20%), Catholic (32%), Jewish (10%), Muslim (16%), and atheist or agnostic 
(14%); the remainder of the parents (8%) did not identify their child’s religious affiliation. 
7.1.2 Procedure.  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1A, with the following exceptions: Children 
participated in person rather than online, and an experimenter read all items aloud. During each 
trial, participants viewed a photograph of a child who ostensibly held the belief. Photographs 
were used to draw children’s attention to the stimuli. Reasoning that children may be more 
comfortable answering questions about peers, we used photographs of children previously rated 
by adults as appearing approximately the same age as participants. Children did not complete a 
demographic questionnaire. 
Due to the presence of photographs, the phrasing of the experimental items was changed 
slightly; rather than prefacing items with the phrase “someone says that,” the experimenter 
pointed to the photograph and said, “This child says that. . .” The pairings of particular 
photographs with particular statements were counterbalanced across participants. We chose to 
use the phrasing of questions from Experiment 1A rather than 1B because research on natural 
pedagogy suggests that children readily infer that individuals convey information intentionally 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2013). That is, if someone makes a statement like “germs are very big,” 
children are likely to infer that the individual intended to convey the information explicitly 
contained in the statement (germs are big). The natural pedagogy research does not speak to 
inferences that children may make about people who make incorrect factual statements, but this 
literature does suggest that children assume that people intentionally convey the information in 
their statements. Thus, it did not seem necessary to use instructions explicitly highlighting the 
intentional nature of people’s statements in Experiment 2.  Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	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7.2 Results  
  After controlling for multiple comparisons, preliminary t-tests did not reveal a significant 
effect of test location (campus lab or museum) or participant religion on any dependent 
measures; therefore, we dropped these variables from subsequent analyses.
3 Nevertheless, it is 
possible that differences between theists and non-theists would emerge if a larger sample of non-
theist children were tested, and this remains an important avenue for future research.  
We analyzed responses to questions concerning how much participants had learned using 
a 4 (Belief Category: correct fact vs. incorrect fact vs. religion vs. opinion) X 2 (Question 
Category: person vs. world) repeated-measures ANOVA. Main effects of Belief Category (F (3, 
237) = 61.37, p < .001) and Question Category (F (1, 79) = 11.62, p = .001) were qualified by a 
Belief Category X Question Category interaction (F (2.32, 183.56) = 120.65, p < .001). This 
interaction is illustrated in Figure 1 (right panel). 
Participants indicated that characters told them more about the world after stating correct 
factual beliefs (M = 3.23, SD = .56) than after stating religious beliefs (M = 2.56, SD = .54, p < 
.001) and more after stating religious beliefs than after stating opinion-based beliefs (M = 1.70, 
SD = .72, p < .001), which did not differ from incorrect factual beliefs (M = 1.81, SD = .68). At 
the individual level, this pattern (statements of religious belief occupying an intermediate 
position between statements of correct factual belief and statements of opinion) occurred among 
75% of participants. 
Participants also indicated that characters told them more about themselves after stating 
their opinion-based beliefs (M = 2.72, SD = 1.00) than after stating their religious beliefs (M = 
1.92, SD = .68, p < .001) and more after stating their religious beliefs than after stating their 
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belief did not differ from each other (Mincorrect = 1.73, SDincorrect = .84). However, only 44% of 
children showed this pattern (placing statements of religious belief in an intermediate position 
between statements of correct fact and statements of opinion). Because the overall mean for 
statements of religious belief was relatively close to the overall mean for statements of correct 
factual belief, we re-ran this analysis to include individual children who judged that they learned 
the same amount about individuals after hearing statements of religious belief and statements of 
correct factual belief. This analysis revealed that 63% of children either placed statements of 
religious belief between statements of correct factual belief and statements of opinion or 
responded that statements of opinion revealed the highest amount of information about 
individuals and that statements of religious belief and correct factual belief revealed equivalent, 
lower amounts of information.  
Finally, participants indicated that characters told them more about the world than about 
themselves after hearing statements of correct factual belief and religious belief, but more about 
themselves than the world after hearing statements of opinion-based belief (all ps < .001). 
Participants reported that statements of incorrect factual belief told them little about either the 
world or the person holding the belief. 
To directly compare children’s and adults’ responses, we analyzed the data from 
Experiments 1A and 2 together by conducting a 4 (Belief Category: correct fact vs. incorrect fact 
vs. religion vs. opinion) X 2 (Question Category: person vs. world) X 2 (Experiment: 1A vs. 2) 
mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two factors. Each of the variables 
exerted a main effect (Belief Category: F (2.81, 332.04) = 30.47, p < .001; Question Category: F 
(1, 118) = 9.48, p < .01; Experiment: F (1, 118) = 12.73, p = .001). These main effects were 
qualified by three two-way interactions: Belief Category X Question Category (F (2.52, 297.59) Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	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= 154.41, p < .001), Question Category X Experiment (F (1, 118) = 57.46, p < .001), and Belief 
Category X Experiment (F (2.81, 332.04) = 35.12, p < .001). These two-way interactions were 
qualified by a Belief Category X Question Category X Experiment interaction, F (2.52, 297.59) 
= 14.05, p < .001. 
To better understand the 3-way interaction, we examined the simple effect of Question 
Category for each of the 8 combinations of Belief Category and Experiment. As with the 
comparison of Experiments 1A and 1B, these simple effects tests reinforced and extended our 
previous conclusions. Participants in both experiments judged that correct factual claims 
revealed more information about the world than about the individual (both ps < .001). 
Conversely, participants in both experiments judged that opinion-based claims revealed more 
information about the individual than about the world (both ps < .001). The results of the two 
experiments differed for the two remaining belief categories. In the category of religion, adults 
judged that they had learned more about the individual than about the world (p < .001), whereas 
children judged that they had learned more about the world than about the individual (p < .001). 
In the category of incorrect fact, adults also judged that they had learned more about the 
individual than about the world (p < .001), whereas children’s judgments of how much they had 
learned about the individual did not differ from their judgments of how much they had learned 
about the world. The most plausible explanation of the differences between the two experiments 
is that adults have more experience with the diversity of beliefs present among people. Thus, in 
all domains except correct fact—that is, in all domains where people may reasonably be 
expected to differ from one another—adults judged that they had learned more about the 
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people may hold different beliefs in the domains of religion and incorrect fact and therefore 
perceived these types of beliefs as less informative about individuals.  
7.3 Discussion 
Like the adults in Experiments 1A and 1B, children judged that statements of religious 
belief revealed an intermediate amount of information about the world as compared to statements 
of correct factual belief at one extreme and opinion-based belief at the other. Also, like the adults 
in Experiment 1B, children judged that statements of religious belief revealed an intermediate 
amount of information about the person as compared to statements of opinion-based belief at one 
extreme and correct factual belief at the other. Children perceived statements of religious belief 
as sharing some, but not all, of the properties associated with statements of factual belief and 
some, but not all, of the properties associated with statements of opinion-based belief.  
Despite these continuities, children differed from the adults in both Experiments 1A and 
1B in judging that statements of religious belief revealed more information about the world than 
about the individual holding the belief. In fact, as compared with adults in Experiment 1A, 
children rated religious statements as providing significantly more information about the world 
and significantly less information about the believer. In this respect, children perceived 
statements of religious beliefs as more akin to statements of correct factual beliefs than did 
adults. As discussed above, these differences may be due to adults’ greater experience with the 
diversity of religious beliefs and with religious conflicts and disagreements. Thus, adults are 
likely to have greater knowledge of the extent to which there is a lack of consensus surrounding 
theological claims. Even so, it should be emphasized that children did not treat religious beliefs 
as equivalent to correct factual beliefs. By implication, children recognize that there is not a 
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8. General Discussion  
  Previous research (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris et al., 2013) showed that children as well as 
adults distinguish statements of ideological belief, such as religious belief, from statements of 
both factual and opinion-based belief. In that prior research, participants across age groups were 
most likely to say that only one of two disagreeing characters could be right when the 
disagreement concerned a factual belief and least likely to provide this response when the 
disagreement concerned an opinion-based belief. Their replies concerning religious beliefs fell 
between these extremes, suggesting that participants conceptually linked statements of religious 
belief to some degree with statements of factual belief and to some degree with statements of 
opinion-based beliefs. By employing a different dependent measure (asking participants how 
much characters revealed or intended to reveal about themselves and about the world, rather than 
asking whether two people who disagreed could both be right), the current work sought to 
discover how children conceptualize statements of religious belief and to investigate the role that 
development plays in such epistemological understanding.  
  The experiments reveal three noteworthy findings. First, children and adults differed in 
one important respect. Unlike adults, children judged that statements of religious belief provide 
more information about the world than about individuals. Indeed, unlike adults, children judged 
that statements of religious belief provide quite limited information about the individual making 
those claims, even though they agreed with adults that such statements provide more information 
about the individual than do correct factual claims. This difference may reflect an important role 
for experience. In religiously diverse cultures such as the United States, adults are likely to have 
encountered many individuals who do not share their religious beliefs—and may also disagree 
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institutions. Thus, in such cultures adults are likely to be more familiar than children with the 
degree to which religious beliefs vary across individuals and thereby index aspects of an 
individual’s background and outlook. This knowledge may have led adults in Experiments 1A 
and 1B to judge that statements of religious belief are quite informative about that individual, 
presumably because that information is likely to distinguish one individual from another. Given 
that they have experienced less religious diversity, children may be less inclined to think that 
people disagree on religious matters. Thus, young children may have been less able to recognize 
that statements of religious belief can provide a considerable amount of individuating 
information about any one person. This interpretation predicts that children of the same age will 
be more or less sensitive to the individuating information that is provided by statements of 
religious belief depending on the extent to which they grow up in a religious diverse or 
homogeneous community. Testing this prediction is likely to prove a fruitful avenue for future 
research. 
Second, even though 8-10 year old children were more likely than adults to think of 
statements of religious belief as conveying information about the world, children were 
nonetheless similar to adults in judging that statements of religious belief are somewhat like 
statements of factual belief and somewhat like statements of opinion-based belief. Children 
judged that statements of religious belief provide some amount of information about the world as 
well as the individual holding the belief. This similarity between children and adults suggests 
that decades of experience are not necessary for all aspects of adult-like epistemology to emerge. 
Rather, some aspects of adults’ cognition, notably the judgment that religious claims reveal at 
least some amount of information both about the external world and about the person making the 
claim, are present in childhood.  Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	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Third, children’s judgments concerning statements of belief appear to be driven by the 
information that different types of statements are perceived to provide. Specifically, like adults, 
children judged that statements of correct factual belief provide more information about the 
world than about the individuals who hold the belief. The reverse was true for statements of 
opinion-based belief. Again like adults, children judged such statements to provide more 
information about the person than the world. Children perceived statements of religious belief to 
provide information about the world and to a lesser extent about individuals. Thus, both children 
and adults appeared to judge statements of religious belief as an amalgam of statements of 
factual belief and statements of opinion. 
   The finding that children and adults view statements of religious belief as somewhat akin 
to statements of correct factual belief and somewhat akin to statements of opinion-based belief 
has important implications for social cognition. Specifically, this result shows that even young 
children are beginning to view statements of religious belief as informative both about the 
believer and about the world. By implication, religious beliefs may be recognized as distinctive 
early in development. By the elementary school years, children have already established a notion 
of what religious beliefs are and how they are similar to and different from other types of beliefs 
that people may hold. Although religious beliefs are quite complex, and most adults certainly 
have a stronger grasp of theological nuance than do children in elementary school, even young 
children have an emerging representation of this category of belief.  
Nevertheless, the present research also shows that children perceive statements of 
religious belief to be somewhat more akin to statements of factual belief than do adults. Unlike 
adults, children reasoned that statements of religious belief provided more information about the 
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more absolutist level about statements of religious belief than are adults. Children may be less 
able than adults to understand that statements of religious beliefs are disputed and that in 
religiously diverse societies, they do not reflect cultural consensus. This interpretation is in line 
with Perry’s (1970) work showing that the transition from a more homogeneous home 
environment to a more diverse college environment was an important milestone for adolescents’ 
reasoning about beliefs and knowledge.   
  Thus, while children and adults look similar in some respects (e.g., both judge that 
statements of religious belief provide more information about the world than do statements of 
opinion and that statements of religious belief provide more information about the individual 
who makes them than do statements of fact), important developmental differences emerged. 
Specifically, children did not perceive statements of religious belief to be as informative about 
the individuals who made them as did adults. Rather, children may have overestimated the 
amount of consensus about statements of religious belief and therefore underestimated the 
amount of information such statements provide about individual people. These findings show 
that there is much to learn, not just about the particular religious beliefs that children hold or the 
ways in which those beliefs were acquired, but also about how children situate religious beliefs 
within their larger epistemological framework.   
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Footnotes 
1. We believe the distinction between people who subscribe to any religious belief and 
people who subscribe to no religious view to be theoretically important. For example, differences 
of belief between people who hold religious beliefs and those who do not are likely larger than 
differences between people who are members of different religious sects.  
2. In this and all subsequent F-tests with non-integer degrees of freedom, we used a 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment to correct for lack of sphericity.  
3. One significant contrast emerged: Children whose parents reported raising their child 
in any religious tradition stated that they learned more about the world in general after hearing 
someone’s opinion than did children from atheistic backgrounds (Mtheist = 1.76, SDtheist = .73, 
Mnon-theist = 1.33, SDnon-theist = .29, t (43.53) = 3.43, p = .001). Because all other comparisons were 
non-significant and because this difference was unexpected, we collapsed across religious 
background in subsequent analyses. 
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Appendix  
Statements of correct factual belief: 
Germs are very small. 
People have just one brain, and it is in their head. 
Dinosaurs only lived a long time ago. 
George Washington was the first president of the United States. 
Statements of incorrect factual belief: 
Germs are very big. 
People have two brains, and there is one in each foot. 
There are dinosaurs alive right now. 
Harry Potter was the first president of the United States. 
Statements of religious belief: [Note: This category included both theistic and atheistic items. We 
did not find consistent differences between these categories and therefore collapsed across them.] 
God knows all of our thoughts. 
Only we can know all of our thoughts. 
God can do miracles. 
No one can do miracles. 
After people die and are buried, some of them go up to heaven. 
After people die and are buried, all of them stay here in the ground. 
When people pray out loud, God can hear them. 
When people pray out loud, only other people can hear them. 
Statements of opinion-based belief: 
Oranges are the tastiest fruit of all. Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 39 
Blue is the prettiest color of all. 
Twinkle Twinkle Little Star is the best song of all. 
Monopoly is the most fun game of all to play. 
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Figure 
Figure 1. Children’s and adults’ perceptions of how much information characters had 
revealed about the world in general and about themselves after making statements concerning 
factual, religious, and opinion-based beliefs. Like adults, children perceived statements of 
religious belief as amalgams of statements of fact and statements of opinion. However, unlike 
adults, children judged that statements of religious belief provided more information about the 
world than about the believer.    Running head: WHAT BELIEFS TELL US    	 ﾠ 41 
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